Introduction
As advanced security properties, there are emerging concerns on composability, deniability and adaptivity of cryptographic protocols. The composability, culminating in Universal Composability (UC) [3] , requires secure protocols remain secure even if they are composed with another protocols. The deniability requires secure protocols leave no evidence of their executions. The adaptivity requires secure protocols remain secure (to some reasonable extent) even if some honest parties are corrupted on way of their executions.
In this paper, we want to construct practically efficient commitment protocols with those advanced security properties in some global setup model.
It is known that composable secure commitments, that is, concurrent non-malleable commitments exist in the plain model, based only on standard assumptions such as the existence of claw-free permutations [21, 19] or even one-way functions [17] . Since being based on the plain model, the deniability of them is trivially satisfied, and especially the scheme of [19] satisfies also adaptivity, hence it is already an adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme. However, those schemes cannot be said to be practically efficient.
We show a practically efficient (string) adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme is possible under a global setup model, called a global CRS-KR model.
-We define a notion of adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable commitments, that captures the three advanced properties all at once for commitment schemes in the global CRS-KR model. -We define, as a more-easy-to-prove property, a straight-line equivocal-extractability of commitment schemes and prove that it (with some other auxiliary properties) yields the adaptivedeniable-concurrent non-malleability in the global CRS-KR model. -We construct a straight-line equivocal-extractable commitment scheme in the global CRS-KR model, under the decisional linear assumption and the knowledge of exponent assumption on bilinear groups. The scheme is efficient and practical, using a constant number of pairing computations and three-round exchanges of linear-size messages.
Related works. In the literature there exists only one (to our knowledge) practically-efficient commitment scheme by Canetti, Dodis, Pass and Walfish [4] , that establishes the adaptive-deniableconcurrent non-malleability. Their scheme relies on a global setup model, called augmented CRS model (a kind of global CRS model with an augmented functionality) and is proved to be adaptively UC-secure in that model. It uses four-round message exchanges of square size O(k 2 ) of security parameter k. We believe that the global CRS-KR model that we use is arguably more simple than the augmented CRS model and our scheme, that uses three-round exchanges of messages of linear size O(k), is more efficient than their scheme.
2 An Adaptive-Deniable-Concurrent Non-malleable Commitment
Commitment Schemes
In this paper, we deal with commitments in a tag-based manner. On input value v and tag t, sender S commits to v through a transcript c for receiver R using a CRS σ (Commitment phase). Later, using a local output d of the commitment phase, S decommits c to the value v using the same tag t and CRS σ (Decommitment phase). Hiding property requires even adversarial receiver R * cannot know the value v under the commitment c in the commitment phase. Binding property requires even adversarial sender S * cannot decommit a same commitment c to two different values. More precisely,
Definition 1 (Commitment Schemes). A triple Σ = (K, S, R) of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms is called a (tag-based) commitment scheme if it satisfies the following three properties:
-(Correctness) For any value v ∈ {0, 1} k and any tag, the probability
is negligibly close to 1 (with respect to k). -(Hiding) For any adversary R * and any tag, the probability
is negligibly close to 1/2 (with respect to k). Here, v 0 , v 1 are supposed to be in {0, 1} k . -(Binding) For any adversary S * and any tag, the probability 
Remark 1.
In the above definition, adversary A is restricted to be a type of "selective-tag", namely, A is supposed to choose left tags t 1 , . . . , t n before it knows the CRS and A must use different tags t * j from t i for his challenges. The restriction is not restrictive. In fact, a tag-based commitment scheme that is secure for selective-tag-type adversaries is easily transformed into an ordinal commitment scheme without tags that is secure for fully adaptive adversaries, by using a method of the CHK transformation [7] , just as in the cases of encryption schemes. (Sender generates a key-pair of strong one-time signature. It uses the verification key as a tag and signs a transcript by the corresponding secret key.)
Definition of Straight-line Equivocal-Extractability
As a more-easy-to-prove sufficient condition for the adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleability, we define straight-line equivocal-extractability of commitment schemes, that involves only a "classical" (instead of concurrent) man-in-the-middle adversary. The straight-line equivocal-extractability requires that a left party can be adaptively simulated by some feasible algorithm EQV that knows adversary's secret key and at the same time the property requires that the value committed to by the adversary for a right party can be extracted by some feasible algorithm EXT that knows the trapdoor of the global CRS. More formally, we define two experiments, as to a commitment scheme Σ and an adversary A, as in Figure 2 . Remark 2. The definition requires that the algorithm EQV is independent of adversaries A.
Theorem 1. If a commitment scheme Σ = (K, S, R) is determining, public-coin for R and straight-line equivocal-extractable in the global CRS-KR model, then Σ is adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable in the global CRS-KR model.
Proof Idea. To prove the theorem, we construct a stand-alone man-in-the-middle adversary A ij from an assumed concurrent adversary A against the scheme, that internally simulates left parties besides the i-th left party and right parties besides the j-th right party for A. We use the straightline equivocal-extractability for A ij to upper bound advantage of the assumed A, using a hybrid argument. In doing that, as one subtle point, we need to efficiently construct the view of A i2 , . . . , A im given the view of A i1 , that will be possible since the scheme is public-coin for receiver R.
Proof. Let Σ = (K, S, R) be a commitment scheme that is determining, public-coin for R and straight-line equivocal-extractable. Let EQV be the algorithm that is guaranteed to exist by the definition of straight-line equivocal-extractability for Σ. Let A be arbitrary feasible adversary against 
Σ.
We can assume A is deterministic without loss of generality (by supposing A's coins are included in its input z). We want to construct a simulator S that satisfies
for any values v 1 , · · · , v m (∈ {0, 1} k ) and any string z. We construct such simulator S as follows:
-Simulator S on input a string z: 
. , m).
Toward showing Equation (1) with the above S, we first construct a (classical) man-in-themiddle adversary A i,j using A as follows (i = 0, . . . , m − 1, j = 1, . . . , n). 
Receiving CRS
On the other hand, when i = 0, all of the left parties are honestly simulated to commit to v i . Moreover the straight-line equivocal-extractability of Σ means that det(c * j ) = EXT (i,j) (τ, view A i,j ) (with exception of negligible probability). Hence, we have
By Equations (2) and (3), Equation (1) 
and Σ is public-coin with respect to receivers.)
(In both cases, the first i left parties are simulated by EQV.) Then, by definition of Expand, we have
Similarly, we have
The straight-line equivocal-extractability of Σ against B means that the outputs of realCom (4) 
and (5). 2 2
Remark 3. We can construct a deniable concurrent zero-knowledge argument if the adaptivedeniable-concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme once exists, by using the GMW protocol of graph 3-coloring instantiated with it. That means -It is difficult (if not impossible) to construct adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes only using the CRS model, since deniable concurrent zero-knowledge arguments are known to be difficult in the CRS model [20] . -An efficient construction of adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme in the global CRS-KR model, that will be shown in the next section, gives an efficient deniable concurrent zero-knowledge argument in the global CRS-KR model. (We remark that the efficient concurrent zero-knowledge scheme of [11] in the auxiliary string is not deniable.)
A Construction of Straight-line Equivocal-Extractable Commitment
This section constructs a determining, public-coin for receivers, and straight-line equivocal-extractable commitment scheme in the global CRS-KR model, using bilinear groups. The scheme is practically efficient, using a constant number of pairing computations and three-round exchanges of linear-size messages.
Design Principle
The basic design of our commitment scheme follows the one of Damgård and Nielsen [13] . Generate a one-time commitment key of a base commitment using a coin-flipping protocol and then commit to a value by the base commitment with the generated one-time key. CRS is used in the coin-flipping. However, in our scheme, the generated coins used to form a one-time commitment key are not opened to a receiver, remaining secret of a sender. To assure the coins are honestly generated and used to form one-time commitment key, the sender appends a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument for proving that honesty. (As seen later, the used NIZK argument can be constructed without using Cook reduction, depending on the property of the bilinear map.) More accurately, the argument proves that the sender formed the one-time commitment key honestly or the sender knows the receiver's secret key, that enables only simulator EQV to form a fake equivocal commitment.
The scheme "duplicates" some items in the sender messages so that extractor EXT can extract the generated coins (used to form a one-time commitment key) and values committed to by adversaries in the course of proving security with help of some KEA extractors.
Building Blocks
The Homomorphic Commitment. As the base commitment, we use the homomorphic commitment of Groth, Ostrovsky, Sahai [16] . The homomorphic commitment is built on a group G with bilinear map. The commitment to a value m is computed as Com(m; r, t)
) with a tuple (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) of six elements of G as a commitment key. A tuple (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) is called linear when there exist α and β that satisfy 
The Perfect Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument. To prove the above-mentioned honesty of generation of one-time commitment key, we incorporate the non-interactive zero-knowledge argument of Abe and Fehr [1] into our scheme in a following way.
Let CRS be a pair of elements g, g c in a group G with bilinear map. A Common input to a prover and a verifier is a triple of A, b,g and a statement to be proved is: "There exist a and s satisfying that A = g a g s c andg = g ab ." The proof is simply a single element P = g s , that is verified as e(A, g b ) = e(g, g)e(P, g b c ). The NIZKA is perfectly simulated in zero-knowledge, if one knows e c satisfying g c = g ec , as P = (Ag −1/b ) 1/ec . The NIZKA is computationally sound, for example, under the Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption in a following way. Given an opening (a, s) of A = g a g s c , an opening c ofg = g c and a convincing proof P , one can efficiently compute g 1/ec as g 1/e c = (g −s P ) b/(ab−c) if ab = c. Note that we need openings of A andg to use the soundness, that would require some use of KEA extractors, as in [1] .
The Commitment Scheme
We describe our commitment scheme. Our scheme Σ = (Σ |Σ ) executes two parallel independent copies of subscheme Σ = (K, S, R) in the global CRS-KR model. Each of these two executions uses an independent global CRS and an independent public/private key pair. If both executions of Σ output a same value m, the scheme Σ outputs that value m. (Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.) Generation of CRS: K selects random four elements e c , e x , d x , e y from Z q and a random element g of G.
K
, gy = g e y and outputs σ = (g, gc, gx, hx, gy).
Commitment phase: Sender S commits to value m (∈ Z q ) using tag tag and CRS σ = (g, g c , h c , g x , h x ) for receiver R with registered public key gID (= g e ID ), as follows:
. . , U 6 to R. 2. R randomly chooses b1, . . . , b6 from Z * q and sends them to S.
r+t . S sends the following items to R,
If any of them (for any i) is not true, R aborts.
Decommitment phase: S sends m, r, t to R, who accepts it if
M 1 = g 1 m g 4 r , M 2 = g 2 m g 5 t , M 3 = g 3 m g 6 r+t .
Fig. 4. The Commitment Subscheme Σ = (K, S, R)
Let G be a group of prime order q with bilinear map e(·, ·) : G × G → G T and let H be an injective function from {0, 1} tagLen to Z q (with length tagLen of tag strings). The subscheme Σ = (K, S, R) on group G proceeds as in Figure 4 . (DH(·, ·, ·, ·) means that a given tuple constitutes a DH-tuple.) It relies on a global CRS consisting of five elements (g, g c , g x , h x , g y ) in G and requires the knowledge of receiver's public-key g ID that is also an element of G.
First, parties run a coin-tossing protocol using (part of) the CRS to generate random coins c 1 , . . . , c 6 in Z q * . Then, sender S forms a one-time commitment key (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) using the generated coins c 1 , . . . , c 6 as g i = g c i , and computes NIZK arguments P 1 , . . . , P 6 that yield the one-time key (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) was honestly generated from c 1 , . . . , c 6 or S knows the secret key of R. (Construction of the OR proof follows the standard way of making OR-proof of Σ protocols [6] .) In the course, some part of the CRS is used only after 'twisted' with the tag tag to prevent adversaries from copying generated coins from/to another sessions. Main body of commitment to input m is generated with homomorphic commitment using that one-time key as
In the scheme, several messages are duplicated such as h 1 , . . . , h 6 for g 1 , . . . , g 6 and Q 1 , . . . , Q 6 for P 1 , . . . , P 6 . Those will be used by KEA-extractors to extract the coins generated by adversaries from its view in the proof of security. A decommitment is done in a canonical way.
As seen, the proposed scheme is practically efficient, using a constant number of pairing computations and three-round exchanges of linear-size messages.
Security
First, we review two necessary assumptions. Let G denote a group of k-bit prime order q. Proof. Suppose that a feasible adversary R * with identity ID * breaks the hiding property of the proposed scheme Σ using tag tag with non-negligible probability.
Using such R * , we construct an efficient distinguisher D that distinguishes between a pair of linear tuples and a pair of random tuples. Given a pair of tuples as input, D simulates a sender for R * and plugs the input tuple into the second sender-message as a one-time commitment key, for each of the two parallel executions of the subscheme Σ . In doing that, D uses the knowledge of simulated secret key of R * , and proves it knows the secret key in the OR proof, instead of proving honesty of the fake one-time commitment key. More details follow.
Distinguisher D on input ((g 1 , . . . , g 6 ), (g (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) using as a commitment key. D sends the second message
If R * outputsb which is equal to b, then D outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0.
We evaluate the probability that D outputs 1. When given both (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) and (g 6 ) is equal to the success probability of R * to guess the committed values in the definition of hiding property. This must be nonnegligibly larger than 1/2 by the contradictive assumption.
Thus, the simulated transcript is also determined by values (a i
Hence, D has non-negligible advantage to distinguish between a pair of linear tuples and a pair of random tuples. Such D, by standard argument, implies a distinguisher between a linear tuple and a random tuple with non-negligible advantage, contradicting to the decisional linear assumption. 2 Second, we show the determining property (Definition 2) of the proposed scheme.
Proposition 2. Under the discrete logarithm assumption and the knowledge of exponent assumption on G, the proposed commitment scheme is determining in the global CRS-KR model.
Proof. Since homomorphic commitment with non-linear tuples is perfectly binding, it is enough to show that any feasible adversarial sender S * can generate linear one-time commitment keys  (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) in (both of) the two parallel executions of the subscheme only with negligible probability.
Suppose a feasible adversary S * generates linear tuples (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ), (g + 1 , . . . , g + 6 ) as its one-time commitment keys in either of the two parallel executions of the subscheme Σ for a honest receiver with identity ID (using tag tag) with non-negligible probability. Without loss of generality, we assume S * generates linear tuples in the second execution with non-negligible probability.
Using S * , we construct an efficient invertor I that breaks the discrete-logarithm assumption on G with help of some KEA-extractors. Given g, g c (= g ec ), I sets (g, g c ) in the corresponding part of CRS and simulates a receiver of ID for internally invoked S * . In an execution of the subscheme, I would receive the second sender-message ( 
c in the first sendermessage of S * . (For example, KEA-adversary H c i on input (g, g x ) reproduces the exact view of S * invoked in I using some auxiliary input w x , and outputs (
).) By rewinding S * , I can obtain another openingâ i ,ŝ i of the same A i = gâ i gŝ i c from another second sender-message (ĝ i ), (ĥ i ), (P i ), (Q i ), . . .. By the contradictive assumption we can suppose both (g i ) and (ĝ i ) are linear, and we will see it means that a i =â i with some i. Then I can compute the desired discrete-log e c of g c over g, using such a i , s i ,â i ,ŝ i as e c = (â i − a i )(s i −ŝ i ) −1 . More details follow.
Invertor I on input (g, g c (= g ec )):
1. (Simulate a receiver for S * .) I invokes S * and simulates an honest receiver for S * as follows, for each of the two parallel executions of the subscheme. Under the claim, we can modify the right-hand side of the verifier equation as 
can compute the desired discrete-log e c as e c = (
Else if there exists some i satisfying a i =â i at Step 2b, since we have
Otherwise, we have b i =b i and a i =â i for any i, then it must holdĉ i /c i =b i /b i for any i. In this case, the probability that both tuples (g i (= g c i ) ) and (ĝ i (= gĉ i )) are simultaneously linear is negligible (since the ratioĉ i /c i is uniformly random) and we see that I reaches Step 2c only with negligible probability.
Thus, to complete the proof, all we need is to prove Claim 1. 
Proof (of Claim 1). KEA-extractors H
H c i reproduces the exact view of S * invoked in I using the auxiliary input w x , and generates (g i , h i ) satisfying DH(g, G x , g i , h i ) with the same probability as S * in I does so. When (g, G x , g i , h i ) is a DH-tuple and g i = g c i , we have h H c i outputs (g c i , g c i x ) on input (g, g x ). As directly verified, the items in w x are independent of the discrete-log e x of g x over g. Hence, by the knowledge of exponent assumption, we see that the corresponding KEA-extractor H * c i (in I) outputs c i satisfying g i = g c i only with negligible exception (whenever S * generates valid  (g i , h i ) Now we show the straight-line equivocal-extractability (Definition 4) of the proposed scheme. EQV is given A's secret key e ID * and proves that it knows e ID * in the second sender-message, instead of proving its honesty to the generation of one-time commitment key. By doing this, EQV can use a linear tuple as the one-time commitment key for its commitment. Since linear tuples define equivocal commitments, EQV is able to adaptively simulate left parties without knowing values actually being committed to. We show such simulation of left parties by EQV is indistinguishable from real left parties for feasible adversaries A under the decisional linear assumption on G with help of some KEA-extractors. (To show the indistinguishability, we need to extract the values committed to by A, that is enabled by using some KEA-extractors.)
EXT extracts the value committed to by A from its view view A using the trapdoor information of CRS. For that sake, EXT needs to extract the coins c * i , used by A to generate its one-time commitment key. EXT invokes some KEA extractors on input (g, g x ) using (some part of) the view view A as auxiliary information to extract such coins c * i . Here, we need a care to use the knowledge of exponent assumption in a right way for such KEA-extractors, because the view view A itself is dependent on the discrete-log between g and g x that are included in CRS. (We can use the knowledge of exponent assumption only for KEA-extractors that uses auxiliary information that is independent of its input.) We will carefully examine distribution of view A and pick up some portion from view A that are independent of that discrete-log, making use of zero-knowledge simulators for proofs P i .
In the course of the proof, one key point is to ensure that the adversary A cannot use linear tuples as its own one-time commitment key, even A receives linear tuples as one-time commitment keys from the simulated left party by EQV. This impossibility is brought by the use of tag tag in the scheme for generation of G x = g H(tag) x h x , that is in turn used for the generation of (h i ) in the second sender-message. This dependency on tag prevents the flipped coins generated for one-time commitment keys from being copied from/to other sessions. The detailed proof is in Section A.
By Theorem 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we have 
Conclusion
We defined a notion of adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleable commitments, that captures the composability, deniability and adaptivity at once for commitment schemes. Then we defined a moreeasy-to-prove property of straight-line equivocal-extractability of commitment schemes and proved that it yields the adaptive-deniable-concurrent non-malleability in the global CRS-KR model. We also gave a construction of straight-line equivocal-extractable (especially, adaptive-deniableconcurrent non-malleable) commitment scheme in the global CRS-KR model, under the decisional linear assumption and the knowledge of exponent assumption on bilinear groups. The scheme is practically efficient, using a constant number of pairing computations and three-round exchanges of linear-size messages. 
A Proof of Proposition 3
Let Σ = (Σ |Σ ) with Σ = (K, S, R) denote the proposed commitment scheme on G. We want to show there exists a feasible algorithm EQV such that for any feasible adversary A, there exists a feasible algorithm EXT and
with any value m (∈ Z q ) and any string z (Definition 4).
For that sake, we define four experiments Exp 0 , . . . , Exp 3 in the sequel and proves indistinguishability of their outputs step by step. Exp 0 is nothing but the experiment realCom (g 1 , . . . , g 6 ) as the one-time commitment key only with negligible probability, by exhibiting an invertor I that computes the discrete-log of g c over g with help of the KEA-extractors H c i and H s i using such S * .
To prove this lemma, we again construct an invertor I that computes the discrete-log of g c over g using such A. In addition to the work done by I in the proof of Proposition 2, the new I needs to simulate the honest left party. Since also this I, that sets up public keys for simulated A, knows A's secret key e ID * , there is no difficulty for this I to simulate the left party in Exp 1 (or Exp 2 ).
One subtle point is in the construction of new KEA-adversary H c i . Recall that the work of
x , e y , b 1 , . . . , b 6 , coins1)). In the proof of Proposition 2, the trapdoor d x (in w x ), that is generated to satisfy H(tag)
from the S * 's second message and computed 
So,
x .) Because A must choose distinct tag * from tag (to gain nontrivial advantage), it is guaranteed that H(tag * ) − H(tag) = 0. The proof is in the same line to the proof of Proposition 1, where in order to show the hiding property a distinguisher between linear and random tuples was constructed and it simulated an honest sender for adversarial receiver R * to gain its advantage. In the proof of this claim, a new distinguisher does the same simulation for the left interaction for adversary A, and in addition it simulates an honest right party and extracts the value committed to by A for the right party in some efficient way, using some KEA-extractors, that is needed for the assumed distinguisher to distinguish between the two experiments. Figure 5 .
-Distinguisher D LIN on input ((g 1 , . . . , g 6 ), (g ((g 1 , . . . , g 6 ), coins), where coins denotes the coins used to simulate this execution of subscheme so far by D LIN , except the coins used for generating the first element g in the CRS. 
